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2.1 The Models
The rational expectations hypothesis asserts that the market's subjec-
tive probability distribution of any variable is identical to the objective
probability distribution ofthat variable, conditional on all available past
information. Following the literature, we will restrict our attention to
linear models and focus only on the first filoments of distributions; this
yields models which are analytically and errlpirically more tractable. The
rational expectations implication central to this book's analysis is the
following: the expectation assessed by the market equals the true con-
ditional expectation using all available past information. For a variable
X, this can be written as
(1)
where
<Vt-l == the set of information available at time t - 1,
Em ( l<Vt-l) == the subjective expectation assessed by the market,
E( '<Vt-l) == the objective expectation conditional on <Vt-l'
The application ofrational expectations to financial markets-where it
is referred to as market efficiency-shows ,;vhy the rational expectations
hypothesisshould be takenseriouslyin explainingempirical phenomena.
Tests ofmarket efficiency usually focus on either holding period returns
orprices ofsecurities. Forexample, letYt denote the returnfrom holding
a particularsecurityfrom t - 1tot, wherethe returnincludes bothcapital
gains and intermediate cash income such as dividends or interest pay-
ments. Rational expectations, as in equation (1), then implies the follow-
ing condition:
(2)
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The condition above is too general to be testable. To give it empirical
content we must specify a model of market equilibrium that relates
EmCYtl<f>t-l) to some subset of past information, Ot-l,
(3)
where Ot-l is contained in <f>t-l. For ease of exposition, /(Ot-l), the
representation ofthe model ofmarketequilibrium, will be denotedbyYt.
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields the efficient markets condition
(4) E(yt - Ytl<f>t-l) = o.
This condition implies that Yt - 'Yt should be uncorrelated with any past
available information. When Y, the equilibrium return (or, in loose
parlance, a "normal" return), is viewed as determined by such factors as
risk and the covariance ofYt with the overall market return (see Fama
1976a), the above condition can be stated in a slightly different way.
Market efficiency, or equivalently rational expectations, implies that no
unexploitedprofitopportunitieswill existin securitiesmarkets: attoday's
price, market participants cannot expect to earn a higher than normal
return by investing in that security.
The condition in (4) is analogous to an arbitrage condition. Arbitra-
geurswho arewilling tospeculatemayperceive unexploitedprofitoppor-
tunities and will purchase or sell securities until the price is driven to the
pointwhere this condition holds approximately. An example may clarify
the intuition behind this argument. Assume that for a security, Yt - Yt,
whichis sometimescalledan"excess"return, is positivelycorrelatedwith
some piece of past information known at time t - 1, let us say the
company'spastearnings. Iftodaythecompany'spastearnings are known
to be high, then a higher return than normal for this security is to be
expected over the subsequent period. This is a contradiction because an
unexploited profit opportunity would now exist. Market efficiency im-
plies that, if this opportunity occurred, the security would be bid up in
price until the expected return fell to the normal return. The positive
correlation between past earnings and the "excess" return for this secu-
rity would then disappear.
Several costs involved in speculating could drive a wedge between the
left- and right-hand side of (4). Because the collection of information is
notcostless, arbitrageurswould have to be compensatedfor thatcost and
others incurred in their activities, as well as for the risk they bear.
(Indeed, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) point out, if (4) held exactly,
efficient-markets theory would imply a paradox. If all information were
fully reflected in a market as eq. [4] specifies, obtaining information
would have a zero return. Since there would be no incentive to collect
information, it would remain uncollected and unknown. The market
would then not reflect this information.) Transaction and storage costs11 The Econometric Methodology
would also result in violations of equation (4). Yet financial securities
havethe key feature ofhomogeneity, for the:y are merely paperclaims to
income on real assets. Transactions and storage costs will then be small,
while compensationofarbitrageurs andthecostofcollectinginformation
should not be large relative to the total value ofsecurities traded. Thus
deviations from the condition in (4) should not be large.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from the discussion above.
First, although the efficient marketsorrationalexpectationscondition in
(4) may not hold exactly, it is an extremely useful approximation for
macroeconomic analysis. Second, this condition should be a useful
approximation even if not all market participants have expectations that
are rational. Indeed, evenifmostmarketparticipantswereirrational, we
would still expect the market to be rational as long as some market
participants stand ready to eliminate unexploited profit opportunities. It
is important to emphasize this point when discussing whether survey
forecasts should be used in analyzing market behavior, as Chapter 4
indicates.
A model that satisfies the efficient-markets condition in (4) is
(5) Yt=Yt+(Xt-~)~+Et,
where
Et = a disturbance with the propertyE(E tI4>t-l) = O-thus Et is serially
uncorrelated and uncorrelated with ..~;
X t = the vector containing variables relevant to the pricing of the
security at time t;
~ = the vector of one-period-ahead rational forecasts of Xt, that is,
~ = Em(Xtl<f>t-l) = E(Xtl<f>t-1);
~ = vector of coefficients.
Thatthe model above satisfies (4) is easilyverified by taking expectations
conditional on <f>t-1 of both sides of (5). This yields
(6) E(Ytl<f>t-l) = E(Ytl<f>t-l) + E(Xt- ~I<f>t-l)~
+ E(€tl<f>t-1) = Yt
which clearly satisfies (4).
For expositional convenience, we refer to model (5) as "the efficient-
markets model." Note, however, that the model embodies not only
market efficiency (or, equivalently, rational expectations) but also a
model of market equilibrium. This model stresses that only when new
informationhits the marketwillYt differ fromYt. This is equivalent to the
proposition that only unanticipated changes in X t can be correlated with
Yt - Yt·
As the empirical work later in the book demonstrates, the efficient-
markets model is useful in attacking such interesting questions as the12 Econometric Theory and Methodology
rationality ofinterest rate and inflation forecasts in the bondmarket and
the relationship of monetary policy to interest rates. The econometric
methodologyoutlined here is worth studying for this reason alone. Yet it
is also worth studying because there are many other applications of the
efficient markets model (e.g., Dornbusch 1980; French, Ruback, and
Schwert 1981; Frenkel 1981; Hartley 1983; Hoffman and Schlagenhauf
1981b; Plosser 1982; Rozeff 1974; Schwert 1977a, 1977b).
Theothermodel analyzed in theempiricalsectionofthis bookdisplays
the neutrality propertythat only unanticipated and not anticipated coun-
tercyclical policy will have an effect on business cycle fluctuations. This
model displays the policy ineffectiveness proposition of Sargent and
Wallace (1975) that a constant money growth rule is not dominated by
any rule with feedback. As usually estimated, it has the form
(7)
where
Yt = unemployment or real output at time t;
Yt = natural or equilibrium level of unemployment or real output at
time t;
X t = anaggregate demandvariable, such as moneygrowth, inflationor
nominal GNP growth;
~ = anticipated X t conditional on information available at t - 1;
r3i = coefficients;
Et = errortermwhich might beseriallycorrelatedbutis assumedto be
uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variable.
In the case where the number of lags, N, equals zero and Yt is a
distributed lag on pastYt, this is the model estimated by Sargent (1976a).
The Barra (1977, 1978) model has N > 0 andYt is represented as a time
trendor a linear combination ofsuch variables as the minimumwage and
a measure of military conscription. Other empirical applications of this
model include Barro 1979; Barro and Hercowitz 1980; Barro and Rush
1980; Bj6rkland and Holmlund 1981; Germany and Srivastava 1979;
Gordon 1979; Grossman 1979; Hoffman and Schlagenhauf 1981a;
Leiderman 1979, 1980; Makin 1982; Sheffrin 1979; Small 1979; and
Wogin 1980. Following Modigliani (1977), this model will be referred to
as the Macro Rational Expectations (MRE) model.
The methodology discussed here is also worth studying for its useful
applications in many recent empirical studies which analyze the differen-
tial effects ofanticipatedversus unanticipated movementsin explanatory
variables. These studies make use of the general model
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for different definitions of Yt, Yt, and Xt. They include Bernanke 1982;
Bilson 1980; Bodie 1976; Carrand Darby 1981; Fama and Schwert 1977,
1979; Fischer1981; Flavin 1981; Jaffee andMandelkar1976; Makin1981;
Nelson 1976; Schwert 1981; and Shiller 1980.
2.2 The Methodology
2.2.1 Estimation and Testing
The form ofthe efficient-markets equation is just a special case ofthe
MRE equation where N = 0; hence the discussion here needs to focus
onlyontheestimation andtesting methodologyfor equations (7) and (8).
Tosimplify theexposition, we will limit ourselves to thecasewhere X t is a
single variable. Modifications of the analysis for the case where X t is a
vector of variables is straightforward.
Rational expectations implies that the anticipations of X t will be
formed optimally, using all available infornlation, and, as is usual in the
literature, forecasting models are assumed to be linear. A forecasting
equation that can be used to generate these anticipations is
(9)
where
Zt-l = a vector ofvariables used to forecast Xt which are available at
time t - 1 (this includes variables known at t - 1, t - 2, t - 3,
etc.),
~ = a vector of coefficients,
Ut = an error term which is assumed to be uncorrelated with any
information available at t - 1 (which includes Zt-l or Ut-l for
all i 2:: 1, and hence Ut is serially uncorrelated).
An optimal forecast for X t then simply involves taking expectations of
equation (2) conditional on information available at t - 1. Hence
(10)
and, substituting into equation (7), we have
N
(11) Yt=Yt+ I ~lXt-i-Zt-l-i~)+Et·
i=O
Two identification problems occur in the equation (11) model. Some
assumptionaboutthecorrelationoftheerrorterm, E, andthe right-hand-
sidevariablesis necessaryinorderto identifythe ~ coefficients. Theusual
assumption-the one that is used in the tests here as well as in previous
empirical work on this subject-holds that all the right-hand-side vari-
ables are exogenous and are uncorrelated with the error term. This14 Econometric Theory and Methodology
assumption, that (11) is a true reduced form, implies that least-squares
estimation methods will yield consistent estimates of the ~'s.
Theotheridentificationproblemhas beenraisedby Sargent (1976b). If
Zt- 1includes onlylagged values ofX t and there are no restrictions onthe
lag lengthN, the MREmodel in (11) is observationallyequivalent to "an
unnatural rate model" where anticipated aggregate demand policy also
matters. Hence, in this case, we cannot distinguish between the two
competinghypotheses. Tosee Sargent'spoint, we can write the forecast-




~(L) = polynomial in the lag operator L = I ~iLi.
i=1
Taking expectations of(12) conditional on 4>t-l and substituting into (7)
where N is not restricted, we have the MRE model
(13)
00
Yt = Yt + I ~i[Xt-i - ~(L)Xt-i-l] + Et,
i=O








\fIi = ~i - .I ~j~i-j-l for i~ 1.
J=O
If the forecasting equation in (12) is used to derive expectations in
equation (8) where anticipated as well as unanticipated aggregate de-
mand matters, we have
00
(15) Yt=Yt+ I ~i[Xt-i-~(L)Xt-i-l]
i=O
00
+ I 8i'Y(L)Xt - i - 1 + Et
i=O
which also can be written as (14), where
\flo = ~o
i-I
\fIi = ~i + .2 (8j - ~j)'Yi-j-l for i~ 1.
J=O
Because both models can be written down as (14), the two models are
observationally equivalent: thatis, the data cannotdiscriminate between
them because parameters are unidentified.15 The Econometric Methodology
Theproblemofobservationalequivalence: has arisen in empiricalwork
on whether anticipated aggregate demand policy matters, in particular,
Grossman (1979). Grossman analyzes the MRE model where the aggre-
gate demand variable is nominal GNP growth. His forecasting equation,
however, includes only lags of nominal C ..NP growth as explanatory
variables. Because of the resulting observational equivalence problem,
Grossman cannot and does not test whether the anticipated nominal
GNP growth variables have significant additional explanatory power.
Instead, he reports results supporting the MREhypothesis which rely on
flimsy grounds for identification, namely, the assumption that the lag
length on nominal GNP growth cuts off at six quarters.
It is possible to discriminate between the two competing models by
means of identifying restrictions. These are derived by checking what
conditions must be imposed to keep the MRE model and the model in
which anticipated aggregate demand matters from being observationally
equivalent. This exercise is carried out in i\.ppendix 2.1. The observa-
tional equivalence problem is overcome, parameters are identified, and
tests ofthe MRE model are feasible, by either oftwo conditions particu-
larly important in this book's empirical applications. They are: (1) N is
known to be zero, as in the efficient markets model; or (2) Zt-1 includes
laggedvalues ofatleastoneothervariable besides X which does notenter
equation (11) separately from the ~i(Xt-i -- Zt-1-i"l) terms.
The method for estimating the MRE model involves joint, nonlinear
estimation of the equations (9) and (11) system, which we rewrite as




System (16) embodies two sets of constraints. Rationality ofexpecta-
tions is imposed since the coefficient')' which appears in the equationfor
X t also appears in the equation for Yt. The neutrality property, that
anticipated policy is not correlated with Yt - Yt, is also imposed because
the 8 coefficients on Xr-i are constrained to be zero. Relaxing the
neutrality and rationality constraints, the system (16) becomes
(17) Xt = Zt-1')' + Ut,
N
Yt =Yt+ ~ (Xt- i - Zt-1-i')'*)f3i
i=O I
N
+ I Zt-1-i"l*8i+ E t •
i=O
A likelihood ratio test comparing boththe constrainedsystem (16) and
the unconstrained system (17) provides a joint test ofboth the rationality
constraints')' = ')'* and the neutrality constraints 8i = 0, conditional on16 Econometric Theory and Methodology
the maintained hypothesis ofthe model ofequilibrium output. Note that
(17) can also be written as
(18) X t = Zt-l'Y* + Ut,
N N
Yt =Yt + I ~i(Xt-i - Zt-l-i'Y) + I '8iXt- i + Et,
i=O i=O
where ~~ = ~i - '8i• This is the form used by Barro (1977) in his tests of
neutrality.
As an alternative to relaxing both the neutrality and the rationality
constraints, we can relax one set of constraints only. For example,
maintaining the hypothesis of rationality but relaxing the assumption of
neutrality, system (16) becomes
(19) X t = Zt-l'Y + Ut,
N N
Yt=Yt+ I (Xt-i-Zt-l-i'Y)~i+ I Zt-l-i'Y'8i + Et·
i=O i=O
Under the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations, the null
hypothesis of neutrality, that is, '8i = 0, can be tested by comparing the
estimated systems (16) and (19).
Rather than maintain the hypothesis ofrationality ofexpectations and
then test for neutrality, onecan maintainthehypothesis ofneutrality and
then test for rationality. The unconstrained system used to perform this
test is:




A comparisonoftheestimatedsystems (16) and (20) providesa testofthe
null hypothesis of rationality, that is, 'Y = 'Y*, under the maintained
hypothesis of neutrality. In the efficient-markets case where N = 0,
neutrality is a reasonable maintained hypothesis since the absence of
neutrality would indicate the presence of unexploited profit opportuni-
ties. It must be noted, however, that a rejection of the null hypothesis
that'Y = 'Y* may resultfrom a breakdownofrationality, neutrality, orthe
model of market equilibrium. Furthermore, as is demonstrated in
Appendix 2.1, when N = 0 this test is equivalent to that generated by
comparing the systems (16) and (17), which jointly tests '80 = 0 and 'Y =
'Y*.
The X2 statisticfor the jointhypothesis ofrationality and neutrality can
be partitioned into the contribution from each component hypothesis by
relaxing the constraints sequentially. These constraints can be relaxed in
two different orders. A priori economic reasoning may suggest an
appropriate sequence for relaxing constraints. For example, in testing
whetheranticipatedpolicy is correlatedwith output,it seems appropriate17 The Econometric Methodology
first to relax Ci == 0 andtest neutralityunder the maintained hypothesis of
rationality. Then, without maintaining neutrality, the constraint ~ == ~*
can be relaxed, and rationality can be tested. This is the procedure that is
followed in tests of the MRE hypothesis in Chapter 6.
Under the alternative sequence for relaxing constraints, we first relax
the constraint ~ == ~* and test for rationality under the maintained
hypothesis of neutrality. The next step in relaxing constraints permits a
test ofneutrality without maintaining the hypothesis ofrational expecta-
tions. Yet neutralityhas meaning only ifwe have a theory ofexpectations
such as rational expectations. Realize that the test of neutrality is con-
ducted on the assumption that the expectations of X t in the second
equation of the system (17) are formed with the same information set
Zt-1 as the time-series model ofX t in thefirst equation. Yet, ifwe are not
willing to assume that expectations are rational, there seems to be no
reason to assume that the same set of variables belongs in Z in both
equations in (17). Therefore, it is not clear that this test yields useful
information.
One way to generate the likelihood ratio statistics for the above tests is
to estimate both the constrained and unconstrained systems with full-
information-maximum-likelihood (FIML). Estimation proceeds under
the identifying assumption used in previous research on the MRE
hypothesis, that the y equation is a true reduced form. 1 This assumption
implies that the covariance ofthe error term.s in the two equations of the
system is zero. The estimatedvariance-covariance matrixofthe residuals
is then
SSRx == the sum of squared residuals of the X equation,
SSRy == the sum of squared residuals of the y equation,
n == the number of observations.
The systems analyzed here are triangular, so FIML involves maximizing
the concentrated log likelihood function,
(22) log L = constant - ~ log (det I),
1. In the case where N = 0, even if the asumption is untrue, its imposition will not
invalidate the test statistics (see Chap. 3). However, it is not clear that this desirable
result-thatthe assumption does notmatterto the tests ofinterest here--earries overto the
case where N > O.(23)
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where deti = determinant ofi. The resulting likelihood ratio statistic
[
LC(iC) ] A A
- 2 log --A - = nlog (det ~c/det ~U)
LU(~U)
is distributed asymptotically as X2(q), where
q = the number of constraints (Appendix 2.1 discusses how to count
them),
LC= maximized likelihood of the constrained system,
I:
u = maximized likelihood o(the unconstrained system,
~c = the resulting estimated ~ for the constrained system,
~u = the resulting estimated ~ for the unconstrained system.
Comparison of this statistic with the critical X
2
(q) then tests the null
hypothesis.
Test procedures used in this book proceed in a slightly different way
from that described above, in that they make use of nonlinear least-
squares estimation. Estimation is conducted with nonlinear least squares
primarily for algorithmic reasons. FIML computer packages are usually
not capable ofhandling large numbersofparameters, and this is required
in some of the models analyzed empirically in this book. In addition,
FIMLpackages do not allow us easily to impose the necessarycovariance
restrictions in (21) or to make a desirable degree offreedom correction,
described below, which results in more conservative likelihood ratio
statistics. In contrast, the nonlinear least-squares procedure outlined
here easily implements the covariance restriction and degrees-of-
freedom correction and makes use ofa computerpackage (SAS Institute
1979) that can estimate systems with large numbers of parameters.
The procedure is as follows. Given aninitial estimate for the variance-
covariance matrix ofthe residuals,i,estimate the systemwith nonlinear
generalized least squares (GLS). (The initial i can be obtained from
unconstrained ordinary least-squares estimates ofthe X and y equations
or from preyiously estimated systems.) Given the particular diagonal
form ofthe ~ matrix, nonlinear GLS is equivalent to nonlinear weighted
least squares (WLS) using the estimates from~: that is, the observations
for the X forecasting equation are weighted byYSSRx/SSRy. Appendix
2.2 containsan annotatedcomputerprogramdescribingthis procedurein
great detail. A new i matrix can be estimated using the resulting re~
siduals and the system reestimated again with nonlinear WLS. This
iterativeprocedureis continueduntilthereis littlechangeinthei matrix.
Because the system is triangular, this procedure will converge to max-
imum-likelihood estimates, since theorems showing that iterative three-
stage-least-squares is equivalent to FIML then apply to this nonlinear
case as well. High computation costs required that iterations were con-
tinued only until the estimated variance of all the weighted equations in(24)
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the system differed by less than 5 percent. Some experimentation indi-
cated that further iterations would have altered the likelihood ratio
statistics in the book by at most 1 or 2 percent. This would only lead to a
negligible effect on the inference drawn from these statistics.
2
If the same procedure is followed for estimating the unconstrained
system, then the likelihood ratio statistic in (23) is easily calculated and
can be usedto test the null hypothesis. Although (23) yields valid asymp-
totic tests, it could be misleading in a small sample like that used here.
The problem is that, in the maximum-likelihood calculation of the i
u
matrixofthe unconstrained system, no correctionis madefor substantial
relative differences inthe degreesoffreedom in estimatesofeach uncon-
strained equation. Thus the finite sample distribution ofthe test statistic
might differ substantiallyfrom the asymptotic distribution. Forexample,
in Chapter6, model2.1 (seetables6.1 and6.2), theunconstrainedmoney
growth equation is estimated with 79 degrees of freedom, while the
unconstrained output equation is estimated with only 70 degrees of
freedom. This is a difference of over 10 percent. The problem is even
moreseverein the case ofmodel A16.1 (see tables6.A.16and6.A.17) in
Appendix6.3 ofChapter6: the degreesoffreedom for the unconstrained
money growth and output equations are now 79 and 32, respectively, a
difference of 50 percent. Another way of stating this problem is to say
that the weighting matrix for GLS will have a biased estimate of the
variance ofoneequation relative to another. The bias occurs because the
estimated variances are the maximum-likelihood estimates (the sum of
squared residuals divided by the number of observations in each equa-
tion) rather than the unbiased estimates (the sum of squared residuals
divided by the degrees of freedom).
The likelihood ratio statistics reportedhere are correctedfor the small
sample problem as follows: the constrained system is estimated with the
iterative procedure, and the resulting i
c nlatrix from the constrained
system is then again used with nonlinear WLS to estimate the uncon-
strained system. This corrects the degrees-of-freedom problem because,
in the systems where there are cross-equation constraints, the degrees of
freedom do not differ across equations. Thusi
c does not sufferfrom the
degrees-of-freedom problem ofi
u
• The resulting likelihood ratio statis-
tic, which is also distributed asymptotically as X2(q) under the null
hypothesis, is (Goldfeld and Quandt 1972)




2. Inthe empirical analysis in this book, when Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) tests revealed the
presence of heteroscedasticity within an equation, the time-trend procedure outlined by
Glesjer (1969) was used to weight each observation to eliminate this heteroscedasticity.(25)
20 Econometric Theory and Methodology
where the superscripts on theI indicate that the maximized likelihoods
of both the constrained and unconstrained systems were estimated with
the same weighting matrix IC and
SSR
C = the sum of squared residuals from the constrained weighted
system,
SSRU = thesumofsquaredresidualsfrom theunconstrainedweighted
system.
Although asymptotically the two test statistics are equivalent, in finite
samples thelikelihood ratio statisticin (24) is smallerthanthe alternative
in (23) and is more conservative on rejecting the null hypothesis.
3 To see
this, realize that LU(IU) ~ LU(IC), which implies
[
LC(IC)] [LC(IC)] - 2 10 --- <: - 2 10 --
g uCiC) - g LU(iU ) .
Using (24) rather than (23) will thus give more credibility to rejections if
they occur.
One issue concerning estimation remains to be discussed. Since the
standard test statistics assume serially uncorrelated errorterms, we need
to eliminateserial correlationfrom the residuals. Ifthis is notdone, then,
as Granger and Newbold (1974) and Plosser and Schwert (1978) have
pointed out, we are likely to encounter the spurious regression phe-
nomenon, where significant relationships appearin thedataonly because
there has been no correction for serial correlation. As long as we include
lagged dependent variables in the forecasting equation there should be
little serial correlation in the Ut residuals and no serial correlation correc-
tion will be needed. In the case of the efficient-markets model, theory
specifies that E(Etl<f>t-l) = 0 and hence Et should be serially uncorrelated.
Again no serial correlation correction is needed. However, in the MRE
outputorunemployment model there is no theoretical argument guaran-
teeingthatthe errortermis seriallyuncorrelated. Tocorrectfor potential
serial correlation and thus avoid the spurious regression problem, the
3. The likelihood ratio statistics here are frequently not appreciably different whether
they are calculated using (23) or (24). E.g., in Chapter 6's model 2.1 the likelihood ratio
statistic for the jointhypothesis calculatedfrom (23) is 22.81 vs. the value 22.69 reported in
table 6.1. In the models found in Appendix 3 (Chapter 6), which use up more degrees of
freedom, the difference between statistics calculated from (23) and (24) is more appreci-
able: e.g., in model A.16.1 the likelihood ratio statistic for the joint hypothesis calculated
from (23) is 76.33 vs. the value 66.90 reported in table 6.A.13. Note that the statistic in (24)
is essentially the statistic for a Lagrange multiplier test where the percentage change in the
sum ofsquares is approximated by a change in the logs. Itis well known that the Lagrange
multiplier test is less likely to reject the null hypothesis than a likelihood ratio test, so these
results are notsurprising. Fora further discussion ofthe Lagrange multipliertest, see Engle
(1980).21 The Econometric Methodology
error term in the MRE output or unemployrnent models estimated later
is assumedto be a fourth-order autoregressive process. This specification
for the error term was chosen because fourth-order autoregressions
usually eliminate most serial correlation in quarterly, macro time series.
Indeed, Durbin-Watsonstatistics andthe residual autocorrelationsofthe
estimated models indicate that this correction for serial correlation is
successful in reducing the residuals to white~ noise.
2.2.2 Specification of the Forecasting Equation
Rationalexpectationstheoryimpliesthat )(~is anoptimal, one-period-
ahead forecast, conditional on available information. Thus an appropri-
ate forecasting equation for X t should rely only on lagged explanatory
variables. Economic theory may not be very valuable in generating an
accurate model of expectations formation because it is difficult on theo-
reticalgroundstoexclude anypieceofinforrn,ation available attime t - 1
fromthe 2 vectoras a usefulpredictorofa policyvariable. Anyparticular
variable may be a useful predictor of X t even if there is no strong
theoretical reason to include it in the 2 t - 1 vector, because the personali-
ties involved in policymaking may be such that they react to this variable
nonetheless. For example, if the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System were to link monetary policy to the level of unemploy-
ment, even though there is no good reason for doing so in a world where
the policy ineffectiveness proposition holds, 'we would still expect to find
that the unemployment rate would be highly useful in predicting money
growth. This suggests that an atheoretical statistical procedure may/be
superior to economic theory for deciding on the forecasting equation's
specification.
Two procedures are used in this book to specify the forecasting equa-
tions. The simplest uses univariate time-series models ofthe autoregres-
sive type. In the empirical studies later in the book these models are
usually subject to unstable coefficients and, nlore important, should only
be used in the efficient-markets model where N = 0 because of the
observational equivalence problem discussed earlier. Multivariate fore-
casting models are therefore needed. The (}ranger (1969) "causality"
concept is a natural way to approach the specification ofthe multivariate
models. A variable 2 is said to Granger-cause another variable X, if X
canbepredictedbetterfrom pastvalues of2 andX thanfrom pastvalues
of X alone. Our forecasting equation for )( should definitely include
lagged values ofX to eliminate anyserialcorrelationin the residuals. If2
Ganger-causesX, then it should be used also in an optimalforecast ofX.
Hence, as is also argued in Sargent (1981), it belongs as an explanatory
variable in the forecasting equation. Note that the issue here is the
predictive content of information-which is what Granger-causality is
really meant to analyze-and does not involve the tricky concept and22 Econometric Theory and Methodology
issue of economic causality which has led to so much confusion in the
literature (see Zellner 1979).
TheGranger-criterionfor specifyingthemultivariateforecasting equa-
tion is as follows. The X variable is regressed on its own four lagged
values (fourlags usually ensurewhite noise residuals in thequarterlydata
usedin this study) as well as onfour laggedvalues ofa wide-ranging setof
macro variables. The four lagged values of each of these variables are
retained in the equation only if they are jointly significant at some
marginal significance level (the 5 percent level is one choice). This
procedure has the advantage of imposing a discipline on the researcher
that prevents his searching for a forecasting equation specification that
yields results confirming his prior on the validity of the null hypothesis.
Notethat a stepwiseregression proceduremight miss significant explana-
tory variables because ofthe orderthat it chooses to run the regressions.
Some judgmentmust be used in conductinga more general searchto find
a specification that includes any variables with significant explanatory
power.
2.2.3 Specification of the Lag Length, N
The theory of efficient markets indicates that only contemporaneous
surprises will be correlatedwithYt - Yt, and hence N = O. However, the
theoretical framework for the MRE model does not specify what the lag
length, N, should be. For example, McCallum (1979a) argues that if all
the state variables are included in the MRE output or unemployment
equation, then the theory does imply that N = O. However, since rel-
evant state variables are almost surely excluded from estimated MRE
equations, the lag length is not known. In studying the MREmodel here,
a primary objective is to obtain information on the robustness ofresults.
Asdiscussedin Leamer(1978), experimentingwithplausible, less restric-
tive models is a necessary strategy for verifying robustness of results.
The addition ofirrelevantvariables to an estimated model only has the
disadvantage ofa potentialdecrease in powerofthe likelihood ratio tests
so that we would be less likely to reject the null hypothesis if it were
untrue. It will not result in invalid test statistics; that is, the test statistics
will have the assumed asymptotic distributions. However, excluding
relevantvariableswill renderteststatisticsinvalid. Furthermore, because
rejections ofthe null hypothesis are less likely when the powerofa test is
reducedby theadditionofirrelevantvariables, a rejectionin this case ata
standard significance level is even stronger evidence against the null
hypothesis. This is the rationale behind Leamer's (1978) suggestion that
when the power of a test decreases-that is, the probability of Type II
error increases-then the significance level used to signify rejection
should be increased as well. The reasoning above suggests that less23 The Econometric Methodology
restrictive models with longer lags are worth studying, and they are a
feature of the later empirical work.
2.2.4 Specification ofy
Depending on the model studied, many different specifications ofYt
may be appropriate. This becomes apparent in the empirical analysis
later in the book. Is a correct specification of Yt always a necessary
requirement for generating reliable tests of the models described here?
This question is particularly important because some specifications ofYt
used in the empirical studies in this book are crude, which makes us
suspect that they may not be entirely accurate.
The answer to this question is central to an understanding ofmuch of
theempiricalliteratureonefficientmarketsandthepolicyineffectiveness
proposition. For example, tests ofmarket efficiency have often assumed
thatYt, the equilibrium nominal return on a security such as a stock or
bond, is constant. This is clearly a very crude model of market equilib-
rium, andwe might expect that it will result in a rejection ofthe efficient-
markets model. Yetthis often does notoccur. Why? The answeris thatas
long as the variation ofYtis small relative to the variation ofYt - Yt, then
the specification of Yt will have little impact on tests of the efficient-
markets model. The reason in this case is that the correctYt model will
only explain a small percentage of the variation in Yt and thus will have
little explanatorypower. Thenalterationsin theYt specificationwill make
little difference to the fit ofthe model and hence to its test statistics. This
is what we would expect to find in cases where the security is long-lived,
such as a long-term bond or common stock, and the holding period is
short, say three months. Then the actual return, Yo has large variation,
while any reasonable model ofmarket equilibrium for Yt indicates that it
has only small variation. It is exactly in such cases as these where the
crude model ofthe constancy ofYt does not lead to rejections of market
efficiency.
The interested reader can find a further discussion of this issue along
with clarifying figures in Fama (1976a). The point raised here has been
made in a different context by Nelson and Schwert (1977) in their com-
menton Fama (1975). They stress that, ifYt has little variation relative to
that ofYt - Yt, then tests for the specifications ofYt have little statistical
power.
Proponents of equilibrium or natural rate models in which the policy
ineffectiveness proposition holds usually enlphasize deviations from the
natural rate in their explanations of unelnployment or output. This
emphasis makes sense because they believe that the bulk of the cyclical
variation in unemployment or output can be attributed to these devia-
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trend, if there is one, as in the output case) is small relative to the
variation in Yt - Yt. Then, as is argued above, tests ofthe policy ineffec-
tiveness proposition are insensitive to the specification of the model for
the natural rate of unemployment or output (as long as the trend is
removed).
2.3 A Comparison with Previous Methodology
Previous empirical work has tested the neutrality implications of the
MRE hypothesis. How does the methodology of this chapter compare
with that used in the work cited earlier?
Barro (1977, 1979), Barro and Rush (1980), and Small (1979), among
others, use a two-step procedure. They first estimate a forecasting equa-
tionby ordinaryleastsquares (OLS) overthe sampleperiodandcalculate
the residuals, that is,
(26)
Then the residuals are used as the unanticipated aggregate demand
variable in the MRE Y equation,
(27)
which is then also estimated by OLS. Another way of describing this
two-step procedure is to say that the 'Y in the Y equation is assumed to
equal the OLS estimate of 'Y from the forecasting equation. Tests ofthe
neutralitypropositiontheninvolve addingcurrentandlaggedvalues ofX
to the Y equation to yield an equation similar to (18),
(28)
and testing with a standard F test the null hypothesis that the 8 coef-
ficients of X t - i are equal to zero.
This methodology raises several issues, the most important of which
deal with the econometrics. The two-step procedure will yield consistent
parameterestimates. However, itdoes notgeneratevalid F teststatistics.
This procedure implicitly assumes that there is no uncertainty in the
estimate of 'Y. This results in inconsistent estimates ofthe standarderrors
oftheparametersandhence teststatistics thatdo nothave the assumed F
distribution. This can lead to inappropriate inference (see Pagan [1981]
for a formal proof of this statement).
The jointestimation procedure generatesvalid test statistics because it
does not ignore the uncertainty in the estimate of 'Y. It has two other
advantages over the two-step procedure. The joint procedure will result
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each make use ofthe other's information in the estimation process. The
joint procedure also generates tests ofboth the neutrality and rationality
implications of the MRE hypothesis, whereas the two-step procedure
cannot test for rationality and is capable of testing only for neutrality.
What relationship exists between tests of neutrality using the joint
versus the two-step procedure? Is the joint procedure more likely than
the two-step procedure to lead to a rejection ofneutrality? The answer is
no: the opposite is true. By the nature of likelihood maximization in
constrained systems, the joint procedure must attain as high or higher a
likelihoodthaniftheforecasting equationis forced to remain unchanged,
as in the two-step procedure. The likelihood ratio statistic from the joint
procedure should be smaller than the corresponding statistic from the
two-step procedure. Therefore, the joint estimation procedure used in
this book will be even more favorable to the neutrality hypothesis.
Thatthe two-stepprocedureis biased towardrejecting neutralityand is
less favorable to this null hypothesis thanthe jointprocedure is borne out
by a comparison of actual neutrality tests using both procedures. For
example, in Chapter 6, model 4.1 (see table 6.4), the likelihood ratio
statistic from the two-step procedure testing the neutrality constraints is
X2(4) = 22.14, with a marginal significance level of .0002 rejecting
neutrality. The corresponding F statistic is F(4,78) = 5.31 with a mar-
ginal significance level of .0008. (The marginal significance level is the
probabilityofobtainingas high avalue of th{~teststatisticorhigher under
the null hypothesis. A marginal significance level less than .01 indicates
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level.) In table 6.1, the
test statistic using the joint procedure is only X
2(4) = 15.45, with a
marginal significance level of .0039. Obviously, the bias of the two-step
procedure againstthe neutrality null hypothesis is not negligible.
The two-step procedure suffers also from a conceptual problem more
minor than the econometric criticisms ofthe procedure. It assumes that
the OLS 'Y, the estimateof ~ which minimizes the mean-squaredforecast-
ing error, is used in forming expectationsin they equation. Rationalityof
expectations implies only that subjective probability distributions do not
differ from the true probability distributions. This implies that the ~
which is expectedto minimize the mean-squared forecasting erroris used
in forming expectations and not the actual )' which minimizes the mean-
squared error. Thus, in finite samples, the two-step procedure makes an
overly strong assumption about expectations formation. This criticism is
another way of stating the conceptual difficulty with using regression
equations to measure anticipations ofvariable values early in the sample
periodwhen laterdata are used in estimating the regression relationship.
Anticipations are made with information from the future as well as from
the past, which clearly goes beyond the rational expectations principle.
Note that the joint estimation procedure does not suffer from this prob-26 Econometric Theory and Methodology
lem. As rationality implies in this case, the 'Y which is expected to
minimizethemean-squaredforecasting erroris usedtoform expectations
in the y equation. As a practical matter, however, this criticism of the
two-step procedure is not extremely important, because the OLS .y's are
not very different from the jointly estimated .y's and asymptomatically
they will not differ.
One last point about estimation methodology is worth discussing.
Someone used to analyzing the neutrality proposition with the two-step
procedure will tend to focus on the deterioration in fit from the imposi-
tion ofthe neutrality constraints ofthey equationalone. Such a tendency
will be highly misleading in the case of the estimated equations from the
joint procedure. In the joint estimation procedure, if constraints are
imposedonthey equation, thedeteriorationin fit is spreaaover boththis
equation and the forecasting equation. Thus the deterioration in the y
equation fit will not be as severe as when the fit of the forecasting
equation is not allowed to change, as in the two-step procedure. How-
ever, the likelihood ratio statistic in either (23) or (24) demonstrates that
the deterioration offit in bothequationsis involvedin testingconstraints.
Therefore, strong rejections can occur even though there is only a small
decline in R
2 (or rise in the standard error) of the y equation.4
The specification of the forecasting equation in previous empirical
work sometimes violates a rational expectations principle. The theory of
rational expectations implies that ~ in the y equation should be an
optimal, one-period-aheadforecast conditional on information available
at time t - 1. Thus, an appropriate forecasting equation should rely only
on lagged explanatory variables. The procedure for specifying the fore-
casting equations here does satisfy this principle. However, this is not
true in empirical studies which have used the Barro (1977) specification
for the money growth forecasting equation. They include a contempora-
neous variable (FEDVt , the deviation of federal expenditures from the
4. The most striking example in Chapter 6 occurs when results of the model 2.1 (see
tables 6.1 and 6.2) are compared with the 5.1 results (see table 6.5). The comparison is a
little tricky because the model 2.1 is not strictly nested in model 5.1 because of the
polynomial distributed lag specification, but it is still interesting to see what test statistics
arise if we ignore this problem. The pseudolikelihood ratio statistic using (23) of the null
hypothesis 80 = 81 ••• = 820 = 0 and ~8 = ... ~20 = 0 equals 11.69 with a marginal
significance level of .0199. Thus the hypothesis is rejectedatthe 5percentlevel even though
thereis only asmallchange intheR
2 andstandarderroroftheoutputequationin goingfrom
2.1 to 5.1. A numerical explanation of the pseudolikelihood ratio statistic illustrates the
pointin the text. Themaximumlikelihoodestimatesofthe standarderrorsofthe 2.1 and5.1
output equations are, respectively, .00796 and .00774. The percentage difference, calcu-
lated as the change in the logs, is 2.8 percent. The maximum likelihood standard errors for
2.1 and5.1 moneygrowthequations are, respectively, .00409 and .00394, with a percentage
difference of3.7 percent. Both ofthese percentage differences are added up in calculating
the likelihood ratio statistic in (23), which is 92[2 (.028 + .037)] = 12.27 The Econometric Methodology
normal level) as an explanatory variable in the forecasting equation. Yet
it is unlikely that the market has complete knowledge ofthis variable at
time t - 1. That this is a possibly serious misspecification can be seen as
follows. Denoting the contemporaneous variable by At, the forecasting
equation can be written as
(29) Xt = Zt-1 "Y + ~At + Ute
Using rationalexpectationsand denoting E(. .. l<Pt-l) by Et - 1, unantici-
pated X t is
(30) Xt - Xr = Xt - Et- 1Xt = Xt - (Zt-1"Y + ~Et-1At)
= (Xt - Zt-1"Y - ~At) + ~(At - Et-1At)
=Ut+ ~(At - Et- 1.llt)·
Expression (30) is not equivalent to the residual from the forecasting
equation, for it differs by an expression involving unanticipated At. It is
valid to use residuals from the forecasting equation to proxy for unantici-
pated X only if there are no errors in forecasting At. As is shown in the
next chapter, this misspecification can render test statistics for rationality
invalid. Note, however, the more accurately .L4 t can be predicted, the less
serious this misspecification becomes.
This chapter's discussion of the specification of the lag length N sug-
gests that MRE models with fairly long lags deserve study. The criterion
forspecifying the lag lengthN in earlierstudies, ontheotherhand, results
in a fairly short lag length-on the order of two years. The lag length is
chosen by cutting off the lags when the coefficients on the unanticipated
variables are no longer statistically significant in the MRE equation. If
the MRE hypothesis is not valid, then choosing the lag length from an
MRE equation is inappropriate for testing this hypothesis. This is then a
further justification for experimenting with MRE models with longer lag
lengths, as is done in Chapter 6.
Appendix 2.1: Identification and Testing
The various tests discussed in this chapter depend on estimation ofthe
parameters 8i and "y* in the unconstrainedsystem (17). More specifically,
neutrality requires that the estimate of 8i not differ significantly from
zero, and rationality requires that the estimate of "y* not differ signifi-
cantly from 'Y. These restrictions are testable only if the relevant para-
meters are identified, that is, if observational equivalence is avoided. If
not all ofthe parameters are identified, then only some ofthe restrictions
or linear combinations of restrictions are testable.
Appendix2.1 is basedon jointworkwith Andrew Abel (Abel and Mishkin 1983, sec. 5).28 Econometric Theory and Methodology
A procedure is outlined here for determining identification by analyz-
ing an interesting special case ofsystems (16)-(20), where Zt-1 is rewrit-




X t = I Zt-i~i + Ut i=1
X t = a k-element row vectorofvariables relevantfor determiningYt;
k ~ 1.
Zt- i = a (p + k)-element row vectorofvariables dated t - iwhich are
used in predicting X t• It contains the k elements ofX t - i as well
as p other variables; p ~ o.
Yt = a scalar.
~i and ~i = (p + k) matrices of parameters.
~i and 8j = k x 1 column vectors of parameters.
Observe that this system embodies the exclusion restriction that Zt-i
does not entertheYequation except as it enters terms representing ~-i.
The exclusion restriction is crucial to the discussion ofidentification and
hypothesis testing. Note that (AI) embodies the following simplifying
assumptions: (a) the same lag length applies to all variables used to
predict X t in the first equation; and, (b) in the second equation the same
lag length, N, is used for both anticipated and unanticipated X t• These
assumptions, which are made for expositional clarity, can be relaxed and
the following discussion can be generalized in a straightforward manner.
Note also that the row vector Zt-h which is used in the time-series model
for predicting X t, contains the k-element row vector X t - h since lagged
values of the dependent variable are often useful in prediction. In addi-
tion, the row vector Zt- i containsp othervariables at time t - i, wherep
~ O. It is assumed that Ut and Et are uncorrelated and that E(utl<f>t-l) =
E(Etl<f>t-1) = O. Finally, recall that the rationality restriction is 'Vi = 'Vi, i
= 1, ... , M, and the neutrality restriction is 8j = 0, j = 0, ... , N.
The first step in determining identification is to analyze the order
condition. Consider, for example, themostunconstrainedsystem (AI) in
which ~i, ~i, ~j, and 8j are the free parameters to be estimated. Observe
that 'Vi can be estimated by OLS on the first equation in (AI). The
remaining parameters ~i, ~j, and 8j are estimated from the second




at = a (p + k) x 1 column vector of parameters which is zero if
B j = 0, j = 0, ... , N and ~t == ~i' i = 1, ... , M
= ~ [(~i - ~t)~j + ~tBj], 1 ~ i ~; M and°~ j ~ N.
t+]=l
Note thatforj = 1, . . . ,N,the residual at_j can beexpressed as a linear
combination ofthe other right-hand-side variables Zt-1,... ,Zt-M - N.
That is, only the residual at time t, at, is not perfectly correlated with the
other right-hand-side variables. Hence, the most unconstrained form of
this equation that can be estimated by Ol.JS is
M+N
(A3) Yt = at~o + I Zt-lal + E:t·
1=1
Since there are k elements in ~o and (M + N) (p + k) elements in the a
coefficients, equation (A3) can be used to estimate at most k + (M + N)
(p + k) parameters. As long as this nUIIlber of estimable parameters
exceeds the number of free parameters contained in the ~, B, and ~*
coefficients, the order condition is satisfied.
Identification depends on the rank condition as well as the order
condition. The rank condition is particularly important in the identifica-
tion of(A3) because, in general, it need not be satisfied at the same time
as the ordercondition. This failure to satisfy the rank condition becomes
clear if we rewrite (AI) as
(A4)
M
xi = I Zt-i~l + ui
i=1
where x:, ~r, ~ts, and u: are the sth columns of Xt, ~i' ~t, and ut,
respectively. The scalars ~} and B} are the sth elements of ~j and B j ,
respectively.30 Econometric Theory and Methodology
Notethatfor any particulars, say So, the system will be unchanged bya
doubling ofall the elements of ~tSofor all i and a halving ofS;o - ~;o for
allj. Becauseofthis observational equivalence, the parameters S;o - ~;o
and ~tso are not identified even when the order condition is satisfied. A
restriction on any element of S;o or ~tSo is sufficient to identify these
parameters. If we apply this argument to each of the k values ofs, it is
clear that k additional restrictions are needed for identification. The
restrictions will be provided if either neutrality (Sj == 0) or rationality
(~i == ~t) is treated as a maintained hypothesis. Thus, only if neither
neutrality nor rationality is maintained will the rank condition fail to be
satisfied in situations when the order condition is satisfied.
Tests of hypotheses are conducted by comparing the residual sums of
squares from constrained and unconstrained systems. The number of
restrictions tested (and hence the numberofdegrees offreedom in the X2
statistic) equals the number of identified parameters estimated in the
unconstrained system, less the number of identified parameters esti-
mated in the constrained system. To illustrate this calculation using the
procedures above, considerin the efficient-markets case in which N == 0,
the test ofrationality under the maintained hypothesis ofneutrality. The
lastequationintheconstrainedsystem (where So == 0, ~i == ~t) containsk
parameters (the elements of ~), all of which are identified. The last
equationin theunconstrained system (where So == 0) contains k + Mk(p
+ k) parameters. However, as explained above, only k + M(p + k)
parameters can be estimated. Only if k == 1 will all ofthe parameters in
theunconstrainedsystem be identified. However, even if k > 1, there are
M(p + k) testable restrictions. Theserestrictionsarelinear combinations
of the restrictions ~ - ~* == 0 (see the next chapter for an example).
Another test which may be conducted in the efficient-markets
framework (N == 0) is a test ofthe null hypothesis ofneutrality underthe
maintained hypothesis ofrationality. Recall that the last equation ofthe
constrainedsystem (~i == ~t, So == 0) containsk parameters(theelements
of ~), and observe that the last equation of the unconstrained system
(~i == ~t) contains 2kparameters (the elements of ~ and So). In both the
constrained and unconstrainedsystems, all parameters are identified and
all k neutrality restrictions are testable.
A third test in the efficient-markets framework is a test of the joint
hypothesis of neutrality and rationality. As in the first two tests, all k
parameters ofthe last equation in the constrained system are identified.
In the unconstrained system the last equation contains 2k + Mk(p + k)
parameters(kelements of~, k elementsofSo andMk(p + k) elementsof
~t, i == 1, ... , M), but, as explained above, only k + M(p + k)
parameters can be estimated. Therefore, under no circumstances will all
parameters ofthis equation be identified. However, there are M(p + k)
testable restrictions that are linear combinations of the restrictions ~ -
~* == 0 and So == o.31 The Econometric Methodology
The interpretation of these efficient-markets tests depends on what
hypothesis is maintained. In particular, the test statistic associated with
the joint test of rationality and neutrality is identical to the test statistic
for the test ofrationality, under the maintained hypothesis ofneutrality.
This follows because, although the free parameters in the unconstrained
systems are different, the estimated coef1icients are identical. Further-
more, the constrained systems are the samle. Because ofthe equivalence
of the two tests, one cannot determine whether a rejection is due to a
violation of rationality alone or a violation of both rationality and neu-
trality.
Tests ofpolicy neutrality under the maintained hypothesis ofrational-
ity as in Barro (1977, 1978) and in Chapter 6 furnish another interesting
case. These models assume that the deviation ofcurrent output from its
natural level is affected only by the current and N lagged surprises in a
single policy variable (i.e., k == 1 and N > 0). To obtain identification of
the coefficients onsurprises in the policy variable, these studies implicitly
place restrictions on the covariance of E( with both Ut and with lagged
disturbances. There are two alternative conditions sufficient for iden-
tification of the &coefficients, that is, the coefficients on anticipated
policy. One condition, discussed and used by Barro (1977,1978, 1979),
Leiderman (1980), and in Chapter 6, is the exclusion restriction p 2:: 1.
That is, the time-series model for the policy variable X t contains at least
onevariable thatis notdirectly includedin they equation. They equation
in the constrained system (where &i == 0 and ~i == ~t) contains N + 1
parameters ((30' ... , (3N), and in the unconstrained system (where
~i == ~t) it contains2(N + 1) parameters (130'· .. ,(3Nand&0'· .. ,&N)·
In each ofthese systems, all ofthe parameters are identified because the
number offree parameters is less than the number ofestimable parame-
ters, 1 + (M + N) (p + 1). Therefore all of the N + 1 neutrality
restrictions are testable.
The alternative sufficient condition for identification is M > N; that is,
the number of lags in the time-series model for the policy variable X t
exceeds the number oflagged surprises in the y equation. Although this
condition formally leads to identification, it requires strong a priori
knowledge oflaglengths. Withoutthis priorknov/ledge we arefaced with
the observational equivalence problepl raised by Sargent (1976b).
To identify &i at least one ofthe two conditions above must hold. One
recent example in which this does not occur is in Grossman (1979). His
specification of the time-series equation describing his policy variable
(nominal GNP growth) does not include any variable other than lagged
dependent variables. Moreover, the number of lags in the output equa-
tion exceeds that in the time-series equation for the policy variable.
Therefore, the &coefficients in his model are not identified, with the
result that not all the neutrality constraints can be tested.32 Econometric Theory and Methodology
Appendix 2.2: An Annotated Computer Program
Thecomputerprogramheredemonstrateshow themodelsdiscussed in
this book can be estimated. The particular example is chosen from
Chapter 6 to illustrate the general principle ofestimating models where
(1) current and lagged values of both anticipated and unanticipated
variables have explanatory power, and (2) the error term is specified to
follow an autoregressive process. The program makes use ofthe PROC
NLIN nonlinear estimation procedure in the widely available computer
package SAS, described in the SAS User's Guide (1979). The detailed
discussion ofthis sample program should not only allow a user ofSAS to
exploit the techniques described in this book, but also should provide
enoughofthe program'slogic so thatit can bemodifiedfor use with other
econometricpackageswith nonlinearestimationcapabilities. Itshouldbe
noted that the PROC NLIN procedure of SAS does have one major
advantage: it can handle extremely large problems that are beyond the
capability ofotherpackages. This is not important for a small estimation
problem, but it is crucial for estimation ofmodels such as those found in
Chapter 6 which have over fifty parameters. My experience with SAS's
nonlinear estimation routine has been a happy one: it converges quickly
and is not prohibitively expensive to use.
The program here estimates over the period 1954:1-1976:4 a model
consisting of (A5), a forecasting equation for money growth, and (A6),






MIG = 'Yo + I 'Yi M1Gt-i + I 'Yi+4 RTBt-i
i=1 i=1
4
+ I 'Yi+8 SURPt - i + Ut ,
i=1
7
log (GNPt) = C + 'TTIME + I ~i(MIGt-i - MIG~-i)
i=O
7
+ I 8iMIG~-i + Et ,
i=O
Et = PI Et-l + P2 Et-2 + P3 Et-3 + P4 Et-4 + 1")t,
444
MIG~ = 'Yo + I 'Yi MIGt- i + I 'Yi+4 RTBt - i + I 'Yi+8 SURPt - i·
i=1 i=1 i=1
The cross-equation restrictions are that the 'Yi are identical in (A5) and
(A6). The variables are as defined in Chapter 6. Note that this example
does not make use of the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) restriction.
The interested reader is referred to Kmenta (1971) to see how the PDL
restriction can be imposed by "scrambling" variables.33 The Econometric Methodology
The basic idea ofthe program is to stack the data so that the system of
the two linear equations, (AS) and (A6), can be written as one equation
with theappropriatenonlinearconstraints. I~stimationwith the nonlinear
procedure PROC NLIN is then fairly straightforward.
Notes for Program Listing in Exhibit Al
The SAS data set ONE contains the data used in estimation. The 120
quarterlyobservations runfrom 1947:1 to 1976:4. A numberappendedto
the variable name indicates how many times it is lagged. For example,
MIG is unlagged money growthwhile MIG! is moneygrowthlagged one
period. LGNP equals log (GNP) and C is the constant term.
Lines 1-17: The new data set ONEA created from ONE weights the
variables in the forecasting equation by HElrA in orderto correct for the
heteroscedasticity across equations. Thevalue ofHETA is chosenso that
the weighted sum of squared residuals in each equation approach each
other. The procedure for doing this will be: explained when the output
from the program is discussed.
Lines 18-21: The LGNP variable is dropped from the data set and the
MIG variable is renamed as LGNP. This operation is necessary for the
stacking operation conducted later.
Lines 22-24: The new data set ONER will correspond to the output
equation and it adds the constant term to the data set ONE.
Lines 25-76: Here the stacking operation is conducted in order to
createthe datasetESTused in estimation. The outcome ofthis operation
will be discussed first so thatwe may more easily follow the steps taken to
achieve it. Each variable will have 240 observations with the first 120
corresponding to the output equation and the second 120 corresponding
to the forecasting equation. Ifthe weighted variables are denoted by the
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Hence the first 120 observations correspond to the dependentvariable of
the output equationwhile the second 120 observations correspond to the
dependent variable of the forecasting equation (appropriately weighted
for heteroscedasticity). The variables with an A added to their names
correspond to the appropriately weighted explanatory variables in the
forecasting equation, while those without A (except for LGNP) corre-
spond to the explanatory variables in the output equation. For example,
M1G11947:1 0
MIGI = MIG11976:4 M1G1A = 0
o MIG11947:1
o MIGl~76:4
In the case ofMIGl, the 120 observations corresponding to the forecast-
ing equation aresettozero, while in the case ofMIGIA the 120 observa-
tions corresponding to the output equation are set to zero.
Lines 25-26 conduct the first stacking operation to create data set
TWO. All the variables have 240 observations. The operations in lines
18-21 result in a LGNP variable ofthe form shown above, with the first
120 observations containing the dependent variable ofthe output equa-
tion and the second 120 containing the dependent variable of the fore-
casting equation. For all other variables, the first 120 observations from
the data set ONER correspond to the output equation, and the second
120 observations from the data set ONEA correspond to the forecasting
equation. Lines27-35 addtoa newdatasetTHREEthevariableswith an
A which are identical to their counterparts without A. Lines 36-37 have
data set EST created from data set THREE. Lines 38-63 set to zero the
second 120 observationsofthevariables with noA, andlines 64-76set to
zero the first 120 observations of the variables with an A. The stacked
variables described above are the outcome of these operations.
Lines 77-78: These lines set the first twenty-eight observations ofboth
sets of 120 observations in LGNP to a missing value. This ensures that
when PROC NLIN is used in the following lines, the 1947:1-1953:4
observations are excluded from the sample period and estimation over
the 1954:1-1976:4 sample period results.35 The Econometric Methodology
Lines 79-247: Here the actual estimation is carried out with PROC
NLIN. The parameters have slightly different names than in (A5) and
(A6) above: CO corresponds to c, T to ~r, MD-M7 to ~O-~7' ED-E7 to
00-07, AD-A12 to ~O-~12, and RH01-RH04 to PI-P4.
Lines 79-80: The convergence criterion is set and the residuals from
the estimation are storedas thevariable RI~SIDin the datasetDRESID.
Lines 81-117: The starting values for the parameters are provided.
Lines 118-135: Variables are generated here to facilitate calculations
of the derivatives in lines 193-247. If these derivatives are not needed,
then these lines can be deleted.
Lines 136-139: Anticipated money gro'wth, EM, is generated.
Lines 140-151: Unanticipated money growth, UAJ, and its lags are
generated.
Lines 152-162: Lags of EM are generated.
Lines 163-178: The fourth-order autoregressive correction for serial
correlation in the outputequation (A6) requires the transformation here
of the UM and EM variables into RUM and REM, as shown.
Lines179-192: Themodelconsistingofboththeoutputand forecasting
equation is written down here. Note that it incorporates the necessary
transformation to allowfor theserial correlationcorrection. Thestacking
operation in previous lines ensures also that this model captures the
cross-equation restrictions andthe appropriateheteroscedasticitycorrec-
tion.
Lines 193-247: The derivatives of the model in lines 179-192 are
calculated here. Theversion ofSAS used to estimate this model required
these derivatives. Later versions ofSAS mlay not require them, in which
case these lines and lines 118-135 can be deleted.
Lines248-259: Herethe standarderrorsofbothoutputandforecasting
equations are calculated. They are used., as will be shown below, to
calculate RETA for the heteroscedasticitycorrection and to decide when
the last iteration is reached. Lines 248-250 retain onlythe residuals in the
data set DRESID. Lines 251-259 use PROC MEANS to calculate the
standard error first of the output equation and then of the weighted
forecasting equation.
Discussion of the Output in Exhibit A2
The first page of the SAS output shows the convergence to the mini-
mum sum of squared residuals, and pages 3-5 show the asymptotic
correlation matrix ofthe parameterestimates. Only pages 2, 6, and 7 are
displayed as they are ofthe greatestinterest. Page 2containsthe parame-
ter estimates, their asymptotic standard errors, and the sum of squared
residuals ofthe system. Forexample, the coefficient ofthe constant term
in theoutputequationis 6.18857905 with an asymptotic standarderrorof
.04752109. The sum ofsquared residuals ofthe system, which is needed36 Econometric Theory and Methodology
to calculate the likelihood ratio tests discussed in the chapter, is
.01012971. Pages 6 and7 show the standarderrorsoftheoutputequation
and the weighted forecasting equation, respectively, in the standard
deviation column. The standard error of the output equation is
.00738342, and thestandarderroroftheweighted forecasting equationis
.00753653.
The iterative procedure that corrects for heteroscedasticity across the
equations continues as follows. The variables in the forecasting equation
areweightedbythe ratiofrom thepreviousiterationofthestandarderror
ofthe forecasting equation to the standard errorofthe output equation.
ThismeansthattheweightingvariableRETA from theprevious iteration
needs to be multiplied by the standard error ofthe weighted forecasting
equation divided by the standard error of the output equation. In the
example here, the next iteration would therefore multiply the previous
iteration'sRETA by .00753653 -;- .00738432, which equals 1.020612595.
That is, line 3 of the program would be modified to insert *1.020612595
justbefore the semicolon, and the programwould then be run. Note that
computational costs have been lowered by using the last iteration's
parameter estimates as starting values in lines 81-117. The criterion for
terminating the iterative procedure can be varied but, in the empirical
work reported in this book, if the standard errors of the weighted fore-
casting equation and the output equation differed by less than 2V2 per-
cent, then no further iterations were performed. Thus the results re-
ported in Exhibit A2 are the final iteration.
Procedures for Calculating the
Likelihood Ratio Tests
To carry out the tests in Chapter 6, the first system estimated was the
most constrained where anticipated money has no effect on output but
rationality is still imposed. The only changes needed in the computer
program are to eliminate terms involving REM and EMfrom the model
and derivative statements and to delete lines 92-99 and 203-210. The
next, less constrained system estimated has anticipated money affecting
output and makes use of the program in Exhibit AI. The first iteration
uses the same HETA value used in the final iteration of the most con-
strainedsystem. Thelikelihood ratio testofneutralitydescribedin Chap-
ter2is conductedby comparingthesumofsquaresoftheless constrained
system obtained from the first iteration, with the sum ofsquares for the
final iterationofthe most constrained system. Furtheriterations are then
performed for this system in which anticipated money matters until the
termination criterion is reached.
The most unconstrained system is subject neither to rationality nor to
neutrality, and as there are now no binding constraints across the two
equations ofthe system, each can be estimated separately. The forecast-37 The Econometric Methodology
ing equation can be estimated by OLS while the output equation is
estimated by deleting lines 1-21,25-76,78, and 188-191 from the pro-
gram in Exhibit Al and modifying the derivatives statements appropri-
ately. Note that the CO andAOparameters are not identifiedand so one
ofthemshould besetto a constant. As discussed in Appendix2.1, atleast
one other parameter will not be identified and PROC NLIN will auto-
matically set it to a constant in estimation. In some cases when more
parameters are unidentified, the most unconstrained output equation is
even more linear, and so takes an even sirnpler form.
The likelihood ratio tests of neutrality and rationality jointly, or of
rationality alone, compare the sum of squared residuals of the appro-
priately weighted most unconstrained system with those of the more
constrained systems, estimation ofwhich is discussed above. The appro-
priately weighted sum of squared residuals for the most unconstrained
system equals the sum ofsquared residuals from the most unconstrained
output equation, added to the sum of squared residuals from the OLS
estimatedforecasting equation, divided by thesquareoftheHETAvalue
used in the constrained system's final iteration.Exhibit At
Line No.
Program Listing and Output
1. DATA ONEA;
2. SET ONE;
3. HETA = .4204183267*1.200367097*1.02580668*1.06044268;










14. SURP2 = SURP2/HETA;
15. SURP3 = SURP3/HETA;
16. SURP4 = SURP4/HETA;







24. C = 1;
25. DATA TWO;




30. M1G1=MIGIA MIG2=MIG2A MIG3=MIG3A MIG4=M1G4A
31. RTB1=RTB1A RTB2=RTB2A RTB3=RTB3A RTB4=RTB4A
32. SURP1=SURP1A SURP2=SURP2A SURP3=SURP3A SURP4=SURP4A
33. C=CA;
34. DATA THREE;
35. MERGE TWO TWOA;
36. DATA EST;
37. SET THREE;
38. IF N >=121 THEN M1G=0;
39. IF -N->=121 THEN C=O;
40. IF -N->=121 THEN TIME=O;
41. IF -N->=121 THEN TIME1=0
42. IF -N->=121 THEN TIME2=0
43. IF -N->=121 THEN TIME3=0
44. IF -N->=121 THEN TIME4=0
45. IF -N->=121 THEN M1G1=0~
46. IF -N->=121 THEN M1G2=O;
47. IF -N->=121 THEN MIG3=0;
48. IF -N->=121 THEN M1G4=0;
49. IF -N->=121 THEN M1G5=Q;
50. IF -N->=121 THEN RTB1=0;
51. IF -N->=121 THEN RTB2=O;
52. IF -N->=121 THEN RTB3=0~
53. IF -N->=121 THEN RTB4=O;
54. IF -N->=121 THEN RTB5=0;
55. IF -N->=121 THEN SURP1=0
56. IF -N->=121 THEN SURP2=0
57. IF -N->=121 THEN SURP3=0
58. IF -N->=121 THEN SURP4=0
59. IF -N->=121 THEN SURP5=0
60. IF -N->=121 THEN LGNP1=0
61. IF -N->=121 THEN LGNP2~0
62. IF -N->=121 THEN LGNP3=0
63. IF -N->=121 THEN LGNP4=0
64. IF -N-<121 THEN M1G1A=0;
65. IF -N-<121 THEN M1G2A=0;
66. IF -N-<121 THEN MIG3A=0;
67. IF -N-<121 THEN MIG4A=0;
68. IF -N-<121 THEN RTBIA=O~
69. IF -N-<121 THEN RTB2A=0;
70. IF -N-<121 THEN RTB3A=0~
71. IF -N-<121 THEN RTB4A=0;
72. IF -N-<121 THEN SURPIA=O
73. IF -N-<121 THEN SURP2A=0
74. IF -N-<121 THEN SURP3A=0
75. IF -N-<121 THEN SURP4A=0IF N <121 THEN CA=O;
IF N <=28 THEN LGNP=.;
IF -N->120 AND N <=148 THEN LGNP=.;
PROC NLIN CONVERGENCE=.OOOl;





ZM = MIGI - RHOl*MlG2 - RH02*MIG3 - RH03*MIG4 - RH04*MIG5;
MZM = -MO*ZM - Ml*LAGl(ZM) -M2*LAG2(ZM) - M3*LAG3(ZM) -M4*LAG4(ZM)
-M5*LAG5(ZM) - M6*LAG6(ZM) -M7*LAG7(ZM);
ZR = RTBI - RHOl*RTB2 - RH02*RTB3 - RH03*RTB4 - RH04*RTB5;
MZR = -MO*ZR - Ml*LAGl(ZR) -M2*LAG2(ZR) - M3*LAG3(ZR) -M4*LAG4(ZR)
-M5*LAG5(ZR) - M6*LAG6(ZR) -M7*LAG7(ZR);
ZH = SURPI - RH01*SURP2 - RH02*SURP3 - RH03*SURP4 - RH04*SURP5;
MZH = -MO*ZH - M1*LAGl(ZH) -M2*LAG2(ZH) - M3*LAG3(ZH) -M4*LAG4(ZH)
-M5*LAG5(ZH) - M6*LAG6(ZH) -M7*LAG7(ZH);
EZM = EO*ZM + E1*LAG1(ZM) + E2*LAG2(ZM) + E3*LAG3(ZM) + E4*LAG4(ZM)
+ E5*LAG5(ZM) + E6*LAG6(ZM) + E7*LAG7(ZM)
EZR = EO*ZR + E1*LAGl(ZR) + E2*LAG2(ZR) + E3*LAG3(ZR) + E4*LAG4(ZR)
+ E5*LAG5(ZR) + E6*LAG6(ZR) + E7*LAG7(ZR)
EZH = EO*ZH + El*LAG1(ZH) + E2*LAG2(ZH) + E3*LAG3(ZH) + E4*LAG4(ZH)
+ E5*LAG5(ZH) + E6*LAG6(ZH) + E7*LAG7(ZH)
EM = AO*C + Al*MlGl + A2*MIG2 + A3*MIG3 + A4*MIG4
+ A5*RTBI + A6*RTB2 + A7*RTB3 + A8*RTB4
+ A9*SURP1 + A10*SURP2 + Al1*SURP3
A12*SURP4 ;
UM = MIG - EM;
UMI LAGl(UM);
UM2 LAG2(UM);
UM3 LAG3 (UM) ;
UM4 LAG4(UM);
UM5 LAG 5 (UM) ;
UM6 LAG6(UM);







EM3 LAG3 (EM) ;







































































































































































































































EM6 LAG6 (EM) ;
EM7 LAG7 (EM) ;












REM= EM - RH01*EM1 - RH02*EM2 - RH03*EM3 - RH04*EM4
REMI LAG1(REM);
REM2 LAG2(REM);






RH01*LGNPI + RH02*LGNP2 + RH03*LGNP3 + RH04*LGNP4
CO*C*(1-RHOI-RH02-RH03-RH04) +
T*(TIME - RH01*(TIMEl) - RH02*(TIME2) - RH03*(TIME3)
- RH04*(TIME4»
+ EO*REM + El*REMl + E2*REM2 + E3*REM3 + E4*REM4
+ E5*REMS + E6*REM6 + E7*REM7
~ MO*RUM + Ml*RUMl + M2*RUM2 + M3*RUM3 + M4*RUM4
+ M5*RUM5 + M6*RUM6 + M7*RUM7
AO*CA + Al*MlGlA + A2*MIG2A + A3*MIG3A + A4*MIG4A
+ A5*RTBIA + A6*RTB2A + A7*RTB3A + A8*RTB4A
+ A9*SURPIA + AI0*SURP2A + Al1*SURP3A
A12*SURP4A
DER.CO = C*(1-RHOI-RH02-RH03-RH04);

















DER.AO MZC + EZC;
DER.Al MZM + EZM + MIGIA;
DER.A2 LAGl(MZM) + LAGl(EZM) MIG2A
DER.A3 LAG2(MZM) + LAG2(EZM) MIG3A
DER.A4 LAG3(MZM) + LAG3(EZM) + MIG4A
DER.A5 MZR + EZR RTBIA;
DER.A6 LAG1(MZR) LAG1(EZR) + RTB2A;
DER.A7 LAG2(MZR) LAG2(EZR) + RTB3A;
DER.A8 LAG3(MZR) + LAG3(EZR) + RTB4A;
DER.A9 MZH + EZH + SURPIA;
DER.AI0 = LAG1(MZH) + LAG1(EZH) + SURP2A
DER.All = LAG2(MZH) + LAG2(EZH) + SURP3A
DER.A12 = LAG3(MZH) + LAG3(EZH) + SURP4A
DER.RH01 = LGNPI - Co*c - T*(TIMEl)
-EO*EMI - El*EM2 - E2*EM3 - E3*EM4 - E4*EM5
-E5*EM6 - E6*EM7 - E7*EMB
-MO*UMI - Ml*UM2 - M2*UM3 - M3*UM4 - M4*UMS
-M5*UM6 - M6*UM7 - M7*UMB
DER.RH02 = LGNP2 - co*c - T*(TIME2)
-EO*EM2 - El*EM3 - E2*EM4 - E3*EMS - E4*EM6
-E5*EM7 - E6*EM8 - E7*EM9
-MO*UM2 - Ml*UM3 - M2*UM4 - M3*UM5 - M4*UM6234. -M5*UM7 - M6*UM8 - M7*UM9
235.
236. DER.RH03 = LGNP3 - CO*C - T*(TIME3)
237. -EO*EM3 - E1*EM4 - E2*EM5 - E3*EM6 - E4*EM7
238. -E5*EM8 - E6*EM9 - E7*EM10
239. -MO*UM3 - M1*UM4 - M2*UM5 - M3*UM6 - M4*UM7
240. -M5*UM8 - M6*UM9 - M7*UM10
241.
242. DER.RH04 = LGNP4 - CO*C - T*(TIME4)
243. -EO*EM4 - E1*EM5 - E2*EM6 - E3*EM7 - E4*EM8
244. -E5*EM9 - E6*EM10 - E7*EM11
245. -MO*UM4 - M1*UM5 - M2*UM6 - M3*UM7 - M4*UM8







253. IF N <29 THEN DELETE~




258. IF N <149 THEN DELETE;
259. PROC MEANS;E
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